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Arthur Cobby Commemorative Oration
Military Historical Society of Australia
Victorian Branch Inc

                                             'Cobby - an Exemplary Warrior'

                                           By  Air Marshal I B Gration, AO AFC (Rtd)

Firstly, speaking as the Patron of the Military Historical Society, may I say how delighted I was to learn of the Victorian Branch's initiative in instigating an annual military history oration - the Cobby Oration.  Their initiative is entirely consistent with the objects of the Society set out in our Constitution, viz:  'the encouragement and pursuit of study and research in military history, customs, traditions, dress, arms, equipment and kindred matters;  and the promotion of public interest and knowledge in these subjects.'  And, as a bonus for Victoria, there is the possibility of harvesting that interest in the form of new members.  To link the concept of an annual oration with a famous and distinguished military aviator son of Victoria is equally a master-stroke which, as a retired air force chief also from Victoria, I entirely endorse.
I am also honoured to be invited to give this inaugural oration.  Cobby's life, both within and beyond his Service career, provides a striking example of inspirational leadership.  Tonight I want to dwell on the characteristics which seem to me essential for an effective leader to possess, using Cobby's story as an example.  Accordingly, I have titled this oration 'Cobby - an Exemplary Warrior'.
I have used the term 'warrior' advisedly because I want to emphasise that leadership characteristics are not just the concern of generals and admirals but, rather, apply to all ranks thrust into leadership roles;  indeed, in a broader sense, apply to all walks of life, not just to the military.  But, in Cobby's case of course, his example was first seen in war where the characteristics were relevant to warfare in the field, with its singular aspects of unrestrained aggression, danger and death spread over an extended period.  Hence my use of 'warrior'.
Well, what are the characteristics I am talking about?  Much has been written and debated about leadership characteristics, especially in the context of modern business management.  Tonight I am restricting myself to consideration of military leadership during war;  although, as I have already hinted, most of the relevant characteristics have equal resonance in peace, as demonstrated by Cobby in his employment beyond the air force.
My list of essential military leadership characteristics during war include:
"    Firstly, sufficient luck to survive long enough to develop inherent characteristics.
"    Then, overt expertise in one's role, based on skill and the ability to learn from experience.
"    Backed by demonstrable honesty and integrity.
"    Accompanied by a physical and influential aura - or charisma - which some exude but most do not, so as to inspire followers to follow trustingly and willingly.  (You will now realise that I am a believer in inspirational leadership.)
"    So as to create confidence in followers that the leader knows what he is doing.
"    A demonstrable awareness of unit place in the wider scheme of things;  that is, of those who provide support within the unit, and of the unit's role in supporting the superior authority and adjacent units.  In air combat this would be called 'situational awareness'.
"    An aggressive attitude and courageous - in the sense of facing known danger resolutely.
"    Intelligently creative and flexible.
"    Caring at a personal level, and modest.

No doubt many of you would wish to add to or subtract from that list, but I believe that these traits capture the essence of military leadership.  Note also that the list is probably relevant in any leadership situation, especially if you believe in the inspirational concept.

Let me now address Harry Cobby as a warrior.

Arthur Henry Cobby was born in Prahran, Melbourne on 26 August 1894.   While at school he joined the Army cadets and, at age 18, was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in the 46th Infantry (Brighton Rifles) militia, transferring later to the 47th 1-1.  (Not the 48th as Wikipedia would have it!)  At the outbreak of war in 1914 he attempted to enlist in the AIF but his employment as a bank clerk - a reserved occupation - precluded that.  Eventually, however, he convinced the Governor of the Commonwealth Bank to release him and, on 4 December 1916, he applied for pilot training at the Military Flying School at Point Cook.  He was successful and, on 23 December, joined the Australian Flying Corps.1-2

Initial training at Point Cook was rudimentary and, in Cobby's own words, 'the flying times were negligible'2-1 and then only in box-kites.  On 17 January 1917 he embarked for England, disembarking on 27 March 19171-3.  He then spent the next eight months in further training for his wings, flying several different aircraft types, and suffering en-route his first crash following an engine failure, as a result of which he was hospitalised for three weeks2-2.  Soon after qualifying for and being awarded his wings, he joined his new unit - 4 Sqn AFC - and sailed for France on 18 December 19171-4.
In his book - High Adventure - Cobby describes how inadequate was the preparation for combat for the pilots of 4 Sqn.  He said:
    'My total flying time, both instructional and solo, was about 12 or 13 hours, and this on six or seven different sorts of aircraft....Some attempt certainly had been made to give prospective pilots of our new Australian squadrons a brief term in France before forming up, but they were either shot down, invalided home, or were not available for some reason or other when we moved off.  We were novices almost to a man.'2-3
You will recall that my list of essential leadership traits was headed by the need for good luck so as to allow survival while gaining combat skills.  Cobby's starting point as a 'novice' - as he put it - emphasises why such a learning period is so critical.  Today's air forces go to extraordinary lengths to prepare pilots for combat with realistic training rather than relying on good luck.  The USAF's Red Flag exercises, in which the RAAF regularly participates, lead the world in this respect.
To emphasise the luck factor, it is worth noting that 4 Sqn's first casualties in France were not the result of enemy action but a formation collision in which three aircraft and their pilots were lost2-4.
Cobby's first combat mission occurred on 9 January 19182-5 and his flight's first loss 'over the line' soon followed on 13 January.  On 3 February2-6 he obtained his first kill when he was part of a section of three which attacked and destroyed three German DFWs.  He was obviously learning fast.
Over the next month 4 Sqn tasking altered to a mainly ground-attack role, with fewer scout tasks deep in enemy territory.  On both sides formations also grew, often exceeding 10 or more, rather than the 3 or 4 originally used.  This was the case for Cobby on 20 March when he led two formations of 5 aircraft each on a sector reconnaissance in anticipation of a German 'big push'.  The mission was almost entirely negated by an extensive ground mist but, by chance, it gave Cobby and his flight their first 'do' with Richthofen's celebrated Circus.  It also gave Cobby two more kills:  an Albatross and a Fokker Triplane2-7.
On 21 March the anticipated German 'big push' began and 4 Sqn was heavily committed to ground attack which exposed the aircraft continuously to ground fire of all sorts, with many aircraft suffering severe damage; and, because of the low altitude, leaving little opportunity for air combat.  However, on 10 April while Cobby's flight was en-route for a bombing task, a German Albatross scout unexpectedly presented itself head-on to Cobby:  'There was just time to press both triggers and to dive under him to get out of his way.  He went down into the cloud in flames, but I had hit the pilot, as he had almost jumped backwards out of the cockpit when I fired.'2-8  By the end of April, the 'big push' was halted and 4 Sqn resumed its normal offensive air patrols.
By now Cobby was frequently leading formations of his flight and on 14 May1-5, in recognition of his aggressive talent and leadership, he was appointed temporary A Flight commander.  On 20 May he led a formation of 9 aircraft 'over the line' when they encountered two Pfaltz scouts apparently covered from above by a further 18 scouts.  'The temptation was too great' he said and dived to attack. 'One burst from about 50 yards was enough to put my opponent into an uncontrolled spin.'2-9
On 25 May1-6 his promotion to Captain came through confirming his appointment as Flight Commander.  By this time he had achieved 19 aircraft kills and four balloons destroyed, and was proud of the fact that he 'had not lost a pilot over the lines, nor had one been wounded while he was leading'2-10.  He was also more than half way through his operational tour - although, of course, there was no such concept at that time.  So it might be useful to check how his performance to that point matched my list of essential warrior traits.
He had certainly had the good luck to survive long enough to develop his combat potential.  And there was nothing in his record to suggest any questioning of his honesty or integrity.  His good looks, physical presence and modest account of his off-duty high-jinks reflected the possession of real charisma in the eyes of his followers.  His mastery of his Camel and his air combat skill were evidenced by his score and his continued survival, which in turn inspired confidence in his ability amongst his fellow pilots and ground crew.  And underlying that mastery was the 'sine qua non' of all pilots - and especially fighter pilots - the possession of situational awareness in the air.  And in the broader sense too of being aware of his military surroundings, Cobby understood well his squadron's role in support of the ground forces, and quickly analysed weaknesses in the German air tactics.  As to his personal approach to air combat, Cobby's account in his book 'High Adventure' repeatedly reflects an aggressiveness in his desire to take the battle to his enemy and, in the sense that I have already defined courage, to face known danger resolutely.  As for the last of my listed traits - compassion and modesty - his writings show particular concern for the compassionate handling of those pilots who, for whatever reason, had to be repatriated prematurely;  and also for the intelligent mentoring of new pilots during their introduction to real combat.  Finally, throughout his book there is not a trace of 'braggadocio' or 'gilding the lily'.  His is the story in simple words of a young man thrown into a new, exciting but lethal form of warfare at which he, somewhat to his surprise, excelled.
In short, as measured against my list of warrior traits, Harry Cobby was already unquestionably an exceptional combat pilot and a natural leader in that milieu.  But were those qualities recognised by his commanders?  To answer that rhetorical question let me now resume the story.
On 3 June Cobby was nominated for award of the Military Cross.  Coincidently, the London Gazette of that date announced the creation of the Distinguished Flying Cross as an air force equivalent of the MC.  Thus, on 2 July, the award appeared in the Gazette as one of the earliest Australian DFCs.  The citation read:  'a very gallant and successful fighter and patrol leader setting a fine example to the squadron'.  The official gazette records 'acts of gallantry and distinguished service, conspicuous service rendered, and gallantry in flying operations against the enemy'1-7
For actions in late June Cobby was awarded a bar to his DFC.  The 21 September gazette citation read:  'An officer whose success as a leader is due not only to high courage and brilliant flying, but also to the clear judgement and presence of mind he invariably displays.  His example is of great value to other pilots in his squadron.  During recent operations he shot down five machines in 11 days, accounting for two in one day.'1-8
Also, for further successes during July, Cobby received the second bar to his DFC.  The citation of 21 September reads:  'One evening (15 July) this officer, in company with another machine, attacked five Pfalz scouts, destroying two;  one fell in flames and one broke up in mid-air.  The officer who accompanied him (Lt H.G. Watson) brought down a third machine out of control.  While engaged in this combat they were attacked from above by five tri-planes.  Displaying cool judgement and brilliant flying, Captain Cobby evaded this attack and returned to our lines in safety, both machines being undamaged.  A determined and most skilful leader, who has destroyed 21 hostile machines or balloons, accounting for three machines and two balloons in four days.'1-9
By any measure, the achievement of two bars to the DFC was a rare recognition of combat success.  During WW I there were only three pilots to receive this distinction:  two of whom were Australians - Cobby and Ross Smith.  Moreover, only six Australians have ever been awarded triple DFCs:  those two in WW I, three in WW II and one in the Malayan Emergency.  But there is more.
On 2 November Cobby was made a companion of the Distinguished Service Order.  The citation reads:  'On 16 August this officer led an organised raid on an enemy aerodrome.  At 200 feet altitude he obtained direct hits with his bombs and set on fire two hangars.  He then opened fire on a machine which was standing out on the aerodrome.  The machine caught fire.  Afterwards he attacked with machine gun fire parties of troops and mechanics, inflicting a number of casualties.  On the following day he led another important raid on an aerodrome, setting fire to two hangars and effectively bombing gun detachments, anti-aircraft batteries, etc.  The success of these two raids was largely due to the determined and skilful leadership of this officer.'1-10  I might add that these two raids were maximum efforts, with up to 90 aircraft involved (18 from each of three RAF squadrons and two AFC squadrons).  You can imagine the coordination required to get such a large formation over the target and attacking in turn without losing a single aircraft;  and repeated the following day on a different target with the same devastating result.
To return to my rhetorical question, the decorations speak for themselves.  Cobby's skill as a pilot, his effectiveness in combat, his aggressive and courageous attitude, and his inspirational leadership were unquestionably recognised by the authorities as well as his peers.  And to 'add icing on the cake', on 8 November 1918 Cobby's name was included in General Haig's personal list of those he 'mentioned in despatches'1-11.  There is no doubt that Harry Cobby displayed all the traits of a successful tactical leader.  As well, he was an authentic 'ace', achieving the highest score of 'kills' in the AFC (29 aircraft and 13 balloons)3-1.  He was never shot down by the enemy.  He suffered only three aircraft accidents:  one as the result of an engine failure, one when forced to land in fog, and one when landing in an open field when he was up-ended by a concealed ditch.  He was proud of his record for losing so few of his charges over enemy lines.  And he was never seriously injured.  All of this was achieved in just nine hectic months of combat.  By any measure, he was, indeed, an exemplary warrior.
Cobby's war ended on 14 September 1918 when he was posted to Leighterton as Wing Fighting Instructor1-12.  He was not looking forward to the experience.  As he said:  'I tried every conceivable way possible to get out of it but without avail....The prospect of being chased around the sky by enthusiastic, but only partly trained, pilots was not pleasing.  France was dangerous enough, but England seemed more so.  The last two fighting instructors had been killed in the air in collisions, and the prospect of passing out in that manner was not inspiring.'2-11  Nevertheless, he took up duty on 30 September and immediately undertook intense training to achieve his A1 instructor rating.  He arrived back at Leighterton just in time for the Armistice.  He eventually departed England on 6 May 19191-13.
I am now going to pass quickly over the next twenty or so years to focus on Cobby as a senior officer in the RAAF during World War II.
Back in Australia Cobby transferred to the Australian Air Corps and then, on 31 March 1921, to the newly created Australian Air Force, soon to become the Royal Australian Air Force.  There followed two squadron commands, the second of which (3 SQN) he handed over to then-SQNLDR W. Bostock4-1, of whom more in a moment.  He was promoted WGCDR on 1 May 1933 and appointed Director of Intelligence.  In 1936 he retired, but remained on the Reserve in the Citizen Air Force.  He joined the Civil Aviation Board as Controller of Operations.  At the outbreak of war in September 1939 he rejoined the RAAF, and on 25 July 1940 was promoted to GPCAPT and appointed to be Director of Recruiting.  On 25 August 1942 he was appointed to be AOC North-Eastern Area, headquartered in Townsville4-2.
On 7 September 1943 Cobby was a passenger in a Catalina which crashed on landing at Townsville.  Although injured himself, he risked his life in helping to rescue two other survivors despite the presence of unexploded mines aboard the aircraft.  On 10 March 1944 his award of the George Medal for 'outstanding bravery' was gazetted4-3.
After recovering from his injuries, he was appointed Commandant of the Air Force's Staff School in January 1944.  On 16 June 1944 he was made a Commander of the British Empire for his 'conspicuous service as AOC North-Eastern Area'4-4 .
I n August 1944 he was appointed AOC 10 Operational Group, soon to be renamed 1 Tactical Air Force.  What followed was one of the saddest affairs in the RAAF's history of higher command.  I don't wish to dwell unduly on what came to be known - erroneously - as the 'Morotai Mutiny', but you will need to understand the background if you are to grasp the incongruity of a brilliant WW I tactical leader being removed from commanding one of the RAAF's most important WW II fighting formations because of his perceived failure to fulfil his command responsibility.
Firstly, the higher command of the RAAF had been in turmoil since the posting to the RAF of Williams in 1939, culminating in the posting of Bostock to command RAAF Command under General Kenney of the USAAF and the appointment of Jones to be CAS5-1.  Bostock was senior to Jones before the latter's appointment, and the division of responsibility between operations and administrative support required close cooperation between the two incumbents.  However, the personal antagonism between Bostock and Jones was such that RAAF operational effectiveness was never fully achieved in the Pacific war6-1;  and this fact was widely recognised by unit commanders of RAAF Command and others.
Secondly, with the agreement of the Australian government, MacArthur, in 1944,  had allocated responsibility for the isolation and defeat of the Japanese in the New Guinea, Borneo and East Indies to the allied forces (primarily Australian), whilst the US forces advanced to the Philippines and beyond6-2.  Understandably, this was disappointing for the RAAF fighter squadrons especially as they felt, correctly, that the real war was passing them by.  (Japanese air power was effectively extinguished south of the Philippines by mid-1944.  The last Japanese aircraft shot down by an Australian was on 19 June 1944.3-2)
Thirdly, it was the view of the unit commanders of 1TAF that the tasking of their aircraft against the immobilised but still dangerous Japanese pockets was unproductive and wasteful of aircrews and aircraft.  To this end, on 23 January 1945 Gp Capt Wilf Arthur (OC 81 Fighter Wing) took to Cobby - commander 1TAF - a 'balance sheet' of target damage achieved set against the considerable expenditure of pilots, aircraft and resources which, Arthur believed, showed convincingly that the tasking was decidedly unproductive and unnecessarily wasteful7-1.
Arthur felt that Cobby was appreciative of the analysis, as he (Cobby) asked for copies and wished to discuss the matter with his senior staff officers.  In his evidence to the subsequent Barry inquiry, Cobby described how review and analysis by his staff satisfied him that things were not as bad as Arthur had made out;  and, as a consequence, he instructed that this analysis be discussed with, or sent to, Arthur (who was at that time based at Noemfoor)7-2. 
Cobby, himself, took no further action on the matter.  Apparently he felt that the broad operational concept outlined by 13th Air Force headquarters on behalf of General Kenney required 1TAF to maintain pressure on the isolated Japanese forces so as to ensure their containment;  and he believed that the tasking ordered by Gibson, his senior air staff officer, was appropriate in the circumstances, notwithstanding Arthur's 'balance sheet'.
By March 1945 Arthur, having heard nothing from Cobby and seeing no change in the 'unproductive' tasking, began discussing with his like-minded friends and fellow commanders the need for some dramatic action which would cause the RAAF to review the side-lining of RAAF operations  and employ the RAAF forces more productively in the drive towards Japan.  This group of 8 officers thus decided to seek permission to resign en masse7-3.  Accordingly, on 20 April all 8 submitted identically-worded applications to the Commander 1TAF8-1.
Cobby subsequently said he was surprised by this action, especially as the conspirators refused to give him any reasons for their action, other than to assure him that it was not directed at him personally. He immediately advised Jones because of the administrative and political implications, and Bostock because of the likely disruption to the imminent Oboe operations to recover Borneo.  Bostock in turn advised Kenney.
Bostock was first on the scene at Morotai, interviewing each of the conspirators in turn.  Apparently he felt that he could address the problem within 1TAF, and tried to dissuade the officers from pursuing the resignation path.  However, he only succeeded in getting them to replace the word 'forthwith' with 'at the end of current operations' (meaning Oboe)7-4.  He therefore drafted a long message to Jones, assessing the discontent within 1TAF and recommending that Cobby be relieved of his command and the two senior staff officers (Gibson and Simms) be replaced.  After discussing the contents with Cobby, he dispatched the message forthwith7-5.
Jones arrived in Morotai on 25 April but, without any stated reasons from the conspirators, could not understand their motives.  Kenney happened to be at Morotai that day and asked to see the conspirators.  Jones was upset that Bostock had brought Kenney into what Jones saw as a national problem which was his to deal with, and he threatened to court martial the conspirators.  When Kenney heard of this threat he told Jones bluntly that he - Kenney - would support their defence in the most public way5-2!
Jones agreed with Bostock's assessment that Cobby had failed in his command responsibilities (by losing touch with his units under command and failing to recognise or address the evident loss of morale);  and that the two senior staff officers (Gibson and Simms) were the immediate sources of 1TAF discontent both from their abrasive and autocratic manner, and the fact that they directed the wasteful operational tasking.  Jones decided to replace all three and took this recommendation back to the Australian Government.  Gibson and Simms were posted almost immediately, and Cobby was relieved by Scherger on 12 May7-6.
The Government also set in train a Commission of Inquiry, with Mr Justice Barry as Commissioner.  The Inquiry began in mid-May and the Commissioner submitted his report in August.  The Commissioner found that the conspirators were justified in their concerns about the wasteful tasking within 1TAF, and that Cobby had failed in his command responsibilities7-7.  But by then the war was over, the immediate problem had gone away, and the players got on with the peace.
Cobby resigned his commission on 19 August 19464-5and returned to his pre-war employment with the newly named Department of Civil Aviation, firstly as a regional director then in 1954 as Director of Flying Operations, with his old friend 'Dickie' Williams as the Director-General.  Cobby died on 11 November 1955, aged 61 years4-6.
Let me now quickly return to my list of essential traits for inspirational leaders.  The key question is how to reconcile Cobby's perceived command failure at 1TAF with his proven tactical leadership in WW I.  I believe, as Commander of 1TAF, he lapsed in his 'situational awareness', failing to stay in touch effectively with his subordinate commanders and troops.  But why he made these errors of judgement at the critical time in 1945 we can now never know.
Cobby's performance as AOC North-Eastern area in 1942-43 was apparently effective, but the Bostock/Jones relationship had not yet become a significantly adverse factor at that time, and the relegation of Australian forces to a 'mopping up' role was still in the future.  However, by 1944-45 both circumstances were adversely affecting the morale of RAAF Command and especially 1TAF.  Early in his 1TAF command Cobby had observed how difficult it was for an operational commander whose administrative support was separated from his operational authority4-7.  Nevertheless, these adverse circumstances do not explain Cobby's loss of touch with his troops.
In my opinion, Cobby made three mistakes which hindsight might consider to be in the nature of errors of judgement.
Firstly, when Arthur approached him in January 1945, Cobby failed to recognise the significance of one of his senior wing commanders approaching him directly with a detailed document of wasteful tasking.  Cobby was aware of 'discontent' amongst his squadrons9-1, but failed to appreciate the depth of concern reflected in Arthur's approach.
Secondly, the command import of the 'balance sheet' contents also seems to have been lost on Cobby.  Kenney's operational instructions through 13th Air Force to 1TAF had been purposely general, allowing AOC 1TAF, in particular, flexibility in tasking7-8.  Thus Cobby - as commander - was responsible for the missions (wasteful or otherwise), and whether or not his senior staff officers were in fact the tasking generators.  When Cobby's staff provided an analysis which suggested a less dramatic view of the operational losses, Cobby apparently concluded that, although the tasking was obviously frustrating to the pilots, it was necessary to fulfil the operational objective required by 13th Air Force.  This conclusion was never really tested, but Commissioner Barry subsequently found that the tasking was certainly wasteful and Arthur's approach in January was 'a useful starting point for a judgement of the worth or otherwise of the operations the Wing was carrying out'7-9.
Thirdly, Cobby chose not to explain his conclusion personally to Arthur;  instead instructing his staff to convey the staff analysis and rationale to him.  Such delegation may have seemed routine to Cobby at the time, consistent with his belief that Arthur's concern was understandable but not warranting any change.  However, hindsight suggests that, if he had discussed the matter further with Arthur and recognised the depth of concern felt by the squadrons, he could have modified the wasteful tasking while still meeting the overall 13th Air Force operational objective of suppressing the beleaguered Japanese.  This would almost certainly have satisfied the immediate concern about tasking, especially with the imminent shift of effort to the Oboe operations.
Faced with Bostock's damning assessment of 1TAF's discontent7-10 (albeit based largely on hearsay!);  and, in the circumstances at the time, of a 1TAF liquor-trading scandal with the associated court martial of two senior officers, the resignation request of 8 senior officers, and the beginning of the Oboe operations, Jones really had no alternative but to relieve Cobby of his command and post out the offending senior staff officers.
Even so, both Jones and Bostock subsequently spoke highly of Cobby's overall command abilities and performance.  And the Americans too thought sufficiently of Cobby's contribution to the allied air effort to honour him with their Medal of Freedom with Bronze Palm3-3 .
On that positive note may I now conclude by drawing together Cobby's lifetime achievements.  All the evidence supports the recognition of Cobby as an outstanding leader at the tactical level in WW I.  He was a recognised 'ace', with the highest number of aircraft kills in the AFC.  And he was an authentic Australian hero who filled the physical and legendry expectations of the Australian people at that time.  Measured against my list of essential personal traits, he had them all.
Moreover, he served his nation for the whole of his working life:  firstly with the AFC, then with the RAAF in its infancy, then with the Civil Aviation Board, then back into the RAAF for WW II, and finally with the Department of Civil Aviation until his sudden death.  It is therefore entirely appropriate that such selfless service to the nation should be commemorated annually by an oration named in his honour.  Accordingly, I congratulate the Victorian Branch on its initiative in creating this commendable event, and am honoured to have presented the inaugural 'Cobby Oration'.



1.    Personnel documents held by National Archives of Australia, Series B2455, file 3263833 - Record of Service.
1-1    pp21,13     1-8    p11
1-2    pp4,16        1-9    p12
1-3    pp4,17        1-10    p14
1-4    p17        1-11    p15
1-5    p17        1-12    p31
1-6    p17        1-13    p34
1-7    pp10,30

2.    High Adventure, A.H. Cobby, Kookaburra Technical Publications Pty Ltd, 1981, ISBN 0 85880 044 6
2-1    p24        2-7    pp48,49
2-2    pp29, 30    2-8    p57
2-3    p35        2-9    p62
2-4    p39        2-10    p63
2-5    p39        2-11    p91
2-6    pp41,42

3.    Australian Fighter Aces 1914-1953, A.D. Garrison, APSC&AWM, 1999, ISBN 0 642 26540 2
    3-1    pp65,67
    3-2    p70
3-3    p72

4.    Wikipedia
    4-1    30 Roylance Air Base Richmond, pp36,37    4-5    4,37
    4-2    38 Gillison RAAF 1939-1942 p588        4-6    2
    4-3    43 London Gazette 36418 p1165        4-7    45 Odgers, Air War against Japan,                                p297,298
    4-4    44 London Gazette 36566 p2873

5.    How Not to Run an Air Force, Norman Ashworth, APSC, 2000, ISBN 0 642 26550X and 26550 8
    5-1    26550 X    pp5, 101, 107-108, 121-124
    5-2    26550 8        p312 Extracts from Kenney's Notebooks 1944-1945

6.    Power plus Attitude, Alan Stephens, C'Wealth of Australia, 1992
    6-1    pp64-68
    6-2    p69

7.    The Barry Report-Part II Dealing with Morotai Mutiny
    7-1    pp115, 198        7-6    P141
    7-2    p118            7-7    P198
    7-3    p107            7-8    PP168-170
    7-4    p134            7-9    PP116, 119
    7-5    PP135-137        7-10    PP135-137

8.    'Clearing the Augean Stables' The Morotai Mutiny, Kristen Alexander, Sabretache vol XLV no 3 September 2004
    8-1    p15

9.    Report of Proceedings (Barry Inquiry)
    9-1 p545